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Increasing focus by UN on the rule of law 
During the last decade there has been growing agreement that the rule of law is critical in both domestic and 
international affairs. At the 2005 United Nations World Summit, member states unanimously recognized the 
need for ‘universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both the national and international 
levels’. This resolved an impasse in which some western countries were pressing for improvements in the 
rule of law in developing countries and others were pressing some western countries to adhere to the 
international rule of law – especially with regard to interventions and other missions involving the 
deployment of troops.  
 
One of the problems of this welcome consensus is that the term ‘rule of law’ is subject to a range of 
interpretations/perspectives/dimensions that are affected by context as well as theory. Even within the 
United Nations (UN), the variety of interpretations is considerable and influenced by the perceived missions 
of various UN agencies.  
 
Protection Missions (i.e. UN missions whose mandates include the protection of civilians) now typically 
involve police, military and civilian components from a range of countries as well as NGOs and several UN 
agencies. Most recognize the importance of the rule of law but often have different conceptions of what the 
rule of law means and, more importantly, what it requires. Protection Missions raise issues of both 
international and domestic law and so form one of the intersecting points of the domestic rule of law and the 
international rule of law. These overlapping rule of law issues that should be addressed concurrently and 
consistently rather than divorced at the risk of making the missions and the participants appear hypocritical. 
 
I draw on work on the domestic rule of law going back 21 years and culminating with an OUP book on 
‘Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law’, work on peace missions and the rule of law going back a dozen years 
to a major linkage with (then) Lt Col Mike Kelly and ten years work on the international rule of law 
including a book on the concept and a major project with the United Nations University (UNU), UN rule of 
law unit, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) on ‘building the rule of law in international 
affairs’. The link between the earlier ‘domestic work’ was made when Mark Plunket, the UN Special 
Prosecutor in Cambodia, came to one of our workshops and told me that he was in the middle of the 
practical version of ‘Rule of Law 101’ and that he did not think he had been taught the theory very well. 
However, the practical version did seem to be very much on track with his suggestions for giving priority to 
police, courts and corrections as being necessary to provide security. He introduced me to Mike Kelly who 
had a Hayekian justification for the rule of law in peace missions – if you state clearly, firmly and 
convincingly in advance how you will use force then others adapt their behaviour to avoid that which will 
generate that use of force. The rule of law in this sense must start when the first ‘blue helmet’ puts a foot on 
the ground, not after the first elected president takes office. 
 
What I will seek to do in this talk and, especially, in the paper to follow is to: 
1. understand the various meanings/interpretations/dimensions we give to the domestic rule of law 
2. briefly apply these to the international rule of law 
3. apply them to Protection missions which include both. 
 
The ‘Domestic’ Rule of Law (the rule of law within sovereign states/at the national level) 
Domestically, the rule of law is a majestic phrase with many largely reinforcing and supportive meanings. It 
is alternatively characterized as a fundamental value/ideal, an ethic for lawyers and officials, the basic 
principles of constitutionalism and a set of institutions that supports its attainment. While these multiple 
meanings and dimensions may occasionally serve to confuse, they are generally congruent and mutually 
supportive in that the partial achievement of each supports the fuller achievement of all.  
- This reflects the multifaceted nature of the rule of law.  
- However, it is important to keep the meanings and dimensions distinct to avoid confusion. 
- The differences of meaning do not seem to be essentially cultural. We carried out a project for the 
Open Society Institute comparing governance values in Western and Islamic countries.   
o Islamic/western comparison showed that there was no fundamental difference with 
‘congruent’ if not necessarily identical meanings. 
o However, there are differences within cultures based on emphasis and position. Liberal 
Muslims and liberal westerners have a great deal in common. Fundamentalist Muslims and 
fundamentalist Christians have more in common than either dare admit. 
o All cultures have rule of law traditions (howsoever called) and contrary traditions. 
‘Thick’ and ‘Thin’ theories of the Rule of Law 
One of the biggest distinctions different supporters of the rule of law have is more a matter of classification 
– of what is included within the rule of law and what is listed under different governance values. Some of 
the most popular definitions of the ‘rule of law’ mix an expression of an ideal or value with the institutional 
prerequisites for the achievement of that ideal. Developing ideas found in Hayek, Fuller and others, Raz  
listed eight basic elements of the rule of law: (1) laws should be prospective, open and clear; (2) laws should 
be relatively stable; (3) law making should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; (4) 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; (5) principles of natural justice should be observed; (6) 
courts should have review powers (of the exercise of power by others); (7) courts should be easily 
accessible; (8) discretion of crime-policing agencies should not be perverted. An overlapping principle is 
that sanctions (especially involving the use of force) should only be applied to others according to clear 
rules publicized in advance. 
 
I have characterized this as a ‘thin’ theory of the rule of law. This is contrasted with ‘thick’ theories of law 
propounded by those who seek to incorporate within the ‘rule of law’ other governance values/virtues 
concerning the content and provenance of law i.e human rights and democracy.  
 
Those who adhere to such thin theories are generally just as supportive of democracy and human rights but 
prefer to keep those ‘governance values’ or ‘virtues of law’ distinct, recognizing that they can sometimes 
conflict and that they are rarely introduced at the same time (with the rule of law generally coming first). 
They also recognize that it may be possible to secure agreement to the development of the rule of law before 
agreement can be reached on democracy (and how it is to be interpreted and institutionally implemented) or 
what rights are to be incorporated into the content of law.  
 
Chapter V of the Forum Draft refers to the rule of law and human rights separately – recognizing their 
separate and mutually reinforcing importance – but also their distinctiveness. The UN Secretary General’s 
definition quoted therein is clearly a ‘thin theory’.1 
 
However, this theoretical/philosophical list does not reflect the degree of embeddedness involved in a state 
subject to the rule of law. In such states, the rule of law is also seen as a: 
a. A fundamental Governance Value.  
b. A basic Constitutional Principle.  
c. An Ethic for Officials - i.e. that officials should be bound by the law and can only derive their power 
and authority from law. All such power is held in trust to be used only to the extent permitted and 
for the purposes authorized. 
d. A set of institutions – independent legislatures and courts, an independent bar etc.  
e. The core of nascent Integrity Systems.  
Within sovereign states, each of these dimensions is mutually supportive. 
The Rule of Law as a fundamental Governance Value  
The rule of law is now seen as one of the fundamental values underlying modern ‘liberal democratic’ states 
– along with human rights, democracy, citizenship and the famous trinity of liberté, egalité, fraternité. This 
was not always so. The Treaty of Westphalia was, in many senses, a tyrants’ charter – made largely by and 
for the absolutist rulers of the day. It recognized a set of formally independent and equal states whose 
sovereigns were recognized on the basis of their ability to effectively control the territory of a state. Brutal 
enforcement of their rule was proof of sovereignty rather than a disqualification for it. Internally, absolute 
rule was frequently justified as the only way of avoiding the chaos of a state of nature in which the life of 
man would be nasty brutish and short (Hobbes). Once life and civil peace were secure, more was demanded 
of those states by philosophes, lawyers, and revolutionaries who saw themselves as citizens in whose 
interests sovereigns should rule according to the above-mentioned values. As they sought and gained 
concessions, the post-Westphalian state was gradually civilized by the institutionalizing of those values. The 
rule of law was the first of these values and many states were substantially rechstaats long before they saw 
even a modicum of democracy and human rights. The rule of law is not only the longest standing of 
enlightenment values; it is generally the least controversial.  
The Rule of Law as a basic Constitutional Principle  
The rule of law underlies and is supported by basic constitutional principles such as constitutional rule and 
the separation of powers. However, it does not require a formal or written constitution and the concept 
clearly pre-dates such instruments. What it does require is a separation of judicial power from legislative 
and executive power with that judicial power determining what texts are recognized as laws, how they are 
interpreted and to whom they apply.  
The Rule of Law as an Ethic for Officials (of state and other organisations) exercising power.  
The rule of law is primarily addressed to lawyers and officials rather than citizen obedience. The rule of law 
is the central ethical principle for judges and the legal profession more generally. But it is also central to 
most officials including civil servants, the military and elected officials. All such power is held in trust to be 
used only to the extent permitted and for the purposes authorized.  The domestic rule of law was built by the 
efforts of lawyers, soldiers, politicians and dedicated non-government organisations from the philosophes, 
to unions, to the modern NGO. 
 
                                                 
1 Page 69, citing UNSG’s ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies’ (S/2004/616), 2004. 
Chapter V of the Forum Draft and the UNSG’s definition of the rule of law includes the general acceptance 
of, and compliance with, the law. This is not such a common approach to the rule of law with good reason.  
Individuals may obey for a variety of reasons. However, although the ordinary criminal law applies, or 
should apply, to all, there are a number of laws which are addressed to officials – about what their power is 
and the purposes for which it is entrusted to them. Civil disobedience is appropriate for individuals within a 
society under the rule of law but not for officials.  
 
This is particularly true in relation to the use of force – and why acceptance of the rule of law is a critical 
element in the ethics/honour of the military – and those who deploy the military.  Note that this is not just a 
matter of officials of the state – despite the Weberian notion that the state has a monopoly of violence, even 
legitimate violence. 
 
In the 17th century, the rule of law was as much about controlling the use of force by the local barons and 
bands of mercenaries as royal officials. Now we should look at other sources of power – corporations, 
warlords and private military companies. This is where the Forum Draft rightly refers to the importance of 
‘all institutions and entities (public and private)’ being held accountable. The rule of law is about the lawful 
exercise of power in that the powers themselves and the purposes for which they are exercised are 
determined and regulated by law. 
The Rule of Law as a set of institutions  
Those who value the rule of law recognize that it can never operate effectively as a purely normative 
phenomenon (be it value, ethic or principle). It requires institutions to make it effective so that the rule of 
law may be partially defined in terms of common institutional supports for the rule of law – legislatures, 
courts, police, corrections, independent bar and NGOs – as Ann Livingstone said these are vertically and 
horizontally linked.  Not all those institutions are institutions of the state – traditionally lawyers and the 
church – now lawyers, NGOs and corporations 
The Rule of Law and nascent Integrity Systems  
Since the late 1990s, it has become increasingly accepted that the way to avoid corruption and other abuses 
of power require an ‘integrity system’ – a set of norms (formal and informal), institutions and practices that 
serve to promote integrity (or ‘good governance’) and inhibit corruption. All effective integrity systems 
involve some basic institutional arrangements associated with the rule of law – especially courts and a legal 
profession that are not indebted to the holders of political power and can review the actions of powerful 
institutions to determine whether or not they are within power. These institutions are the oldest and longest 
standing elements of the integrity systems of western states. They are supported by newer institutions of 
democratic governance (parliaments, parliamentary committees) and oversight (ombudsman, auditors-
general, anti-corruption commissions, media and NGO watchdogs) which make rule of law mechanisms 
more effective. Elements of integrity systems also play a crucial role in the protection of civilians so that we 
can see that the overlapping sets of institutions, norms and practices provide for good governance, the rule 
of law and civilian protection.  
Integrity systems are far less developed in international affairs and, naturally, in the countries in which 
peace missions occur.  They face obstacles that lead some to doubt the possibility of an international rule of 
law or international law itself. However, legal institutions often existed and were effective long before 
democratic institutions were formed and became, rightly, the heart of the integrity system. 
Case studies 
We are often asked for case studies. Some of the most interesting case studies can be found in the 
emergence of the rule of law and other governance values within Western countries.  We see that the 
process is not pretty, it is not quick, it involved compromises – some of which worked, some of which did 
not and that it might not be obvious for years which it was. Sometimes the ‘bad guys’ stayed in power – 
they were called ‘kings’. Sometimes power holders were executed, securing transitional justice that led to 
chaos rather than the rule of law. The difference then, as now, was whether those who had been part of the 
problem saw it in their interest to be part of the solution.  
 
Past experience and case studies offer some hope.  The development of the rule of law generally takes a 
long time – but huge strides can be made quite quickly when the alignment of political will and public 
outrage focus on governance. 
 
The International Rule of Law 
How much can experience of the rule of law at the domestic level apply to building the international rule of 
law is a big question which we are addressing in a large project in conjunction with the UN Rule of Law 
Unit, the UNU and the Centre of International Governance Innovation. While this is not the place to provide 
a full report of the work in this project, a few points might be usefully made at this stage.  At the 
international level, there are strong arguments for keeping to a ‘thin’ theory of the rule of law and treating 
democracy and human rights as other values. The application of ‘democracy’ to international affairs is 
particularly problematic. Even here, this is more a matter of classification and tactics than a fundamental 
value difference for most supporters of the international rule of law. However, as in the early stage of the 
development of domestic law, it may only be possible to secure widespread agreement on the international 
rule of law, leaving democratisation of international institutions and the universal implementation of human 
rights to other and later battles.  
 
Most other meanings and dimensions can be extended to the international rule of law – though their 
realisation internationally is much more limited than in most established democracies. This does not detract 
from their usefulness because they indicate areas where progress towards an international rule of law might 
be made. I have discussed these at length elsewhere but will here highlight two: 
Ethics for officials 
As seen above, the domestic rule of law is built into the ethics of key officials of sovereign states operating 
under the rule of law – not just judges, prosecutors and lawyers but soldiers, civil servants and elected 
officials. Most of the key actors within international institutions are committed to international law but 
codes of ethics for international officials are relatively new and rare with the Burgh House principles for 
international judges being less than six years old. Most would be imbued with ethical principles from their 
home states which may well emphasise the domestic rule of law but will say little about the international 
rule of law and may suggest that loyalty to domestic sovereign power is more important. I have argued 
elsewhere that international lawyers and soldiers engaged in UN missions should be in the forefront of 
developing and promulgating codes of ethics to govern their behaviour which respect international and 
domestic applications of the rule of law.2  
Institutions 
The largest problems for the international rule of law lie in the lack of institutions that create, interpret and 
enforce international law. This lack of effective institutionalization inhibits the development of the rule of 
law in its other senses. The lack of a legislature is not a fundamental problem for the rule of law. It makes 
change difficult but all that is needed is a set of clearly agreed sources, the means by which those sources 
generate authoritative legal texts, and the hierarchy of sources in cases of conflict.  
There is a court, the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) which can provide authoritative interpretations of 
those texts and of any conflicts between them. The ICJ is harder to stack than any national appellate court. 
The problem is the lack of compulsory jurisdiction and the limited number of cases that can therefore be 
heard before it. This makes it much harder for the law to give clear guidance to those who want to be bound. 
However, Cassese suggests that the relative weakness of central global institutions means that other 
                                                 
2 Professions without Borders, public lecture, Brisbane (Australia) in August 2009 and Waterloo (Canada) in October 2009 
institutions and practices may take on a greater role – including self-regulation and standard setting by non-
state actors, civil society, business and legal communities.  
This comment about the potential institutional supports for the international rule of law reminds us that 
domestic rule of law is not just about state institutions. States were never the only game in town – whether 
in the protection of civilians or in internal affairs generally. 
 
The Rule of Law in Peace Missions 
Traditionally the goals of peace missions were largely directed to the ending of mass violence. Democracy 
and the rule of law were initially seen as the business of the relevant state or states in which, or between 
whom, the mission operated.  
 
Early peacekeeping missions were aimed at keeping the warring parties apart and it was assumed that the 
relevant sovereign states could and would protect their citizens once the main threat had passed. Over the 
last twenty years many peacekeeping missions have been mounted in states which lack either the capacity or 
will to protect civilians and in some cases have constituted a major threat to civilians on their territory. In 
other missions civilians have been targeted by the combatants. Accordingly, it has been recognized that 
‘keeping the warring parties apart’ does little or nothing to protect civilians and Protection of Civilians 
(PoC) has become a key part of missions.  
 
When the holding of elections became part of UN mandates, the assumption seems to have been that 
security would come first followed by elections with the governance and the rule of law left to the incoming 
regime. During the 1990s Dr Mike Kelly and others emphasized that the rule of law had to start with the 
first troops moving in not after the first elections – as well as the fact that you needed more than troops to 
re-establish the rule of law. This is critical for the success as well as the legitimacy of missions. This was 
part of the impetus for research conducted previously with the Australian Defence Force and Australian 
Federal Police.  
 
If we look at the various aspects of the domestic rule of law, all are highly relevant to Protection Missions 
and their more limited scope and close relationship. Protection Missions must, of necessity, pursue a thin 
theory of the rule of law which can be expanded as stability is secured. Protection Missions must be 
exemplars of respecting human rights in their own activities but generally cannot force the incorporation of 
human rights into the content of local laws. Some definitions of PoC are very wide – e.g. International 
Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) ‘all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the 
individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law’. This seems to go beyond 
protection to promoting rights and better societies. The responsibility for promoting human rights in local 
laws is the primary responsibility of the host state. The primary responsibility of the international 
community is to support the host state in fulfilling that responsibility when it needs assistance to do so. In 
rare cases, this involves taking over some aspects of that responsibility when the state is unwilling to do so. 
In either case, the involvement of the international community in Protection Missions is confined to severe 
breaches of human rights including threats to physical security. In the absence of such threats, there is 
unlikely to be any need for a military (or police) component and the assistance of the international 
community will be through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other development 
agencies.  
 
Protection Missions should seek to incorporate as many dimensions of the rule of law as possible. The areas 
of function and focus listed above might be seen as applicable to the constitution of the mission itself – to 
make them effective, to serve as an exemplar and to help establish more effective governance measures.  
 
The mission will naturally seek to advise and assist the host country to strengthen the rule of law in its 
territory – especially those rule of law institutions of most relevance to the protection of civilians. 
Advise 
 Rule of law principles and to administer them. 
Promote 
 Rule of law as governance value and basic constitutional principle. 
 Rule of law as ethic for key officials. 
Help develop 
 Set of institutions that support rule of law. 
 Integrity systems – especially the legal elements that support PoC. 
 
But the rule of law must not just be the subject of the mission but built into the Protection Mission itself. If 
you believe in the rule of law, you have to practice it as well as preach it and enforce it. The mission is not 
just there to preach and assist but to practice the rule of law in its domestic and international forms. 
 
 Standard rule of law principles should be built in: 
o rules under which missions operate should be prospective, open and clear;  
o these rules should be relatively stable; 
o rule making by the Mission should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules;  
o must be an independent judiciary to judge its actions which must be accessible and have review 
powers; 
o they should observe principles of natural justice and policing and prosecutions should not be 
one-sided; 
o sanctions, especially the use of force should only be applied according to clear rules publicized 
in advance. 
 The rule of law (in both domestic and international forms) as a fundamental governance value of the 
mission itself. 
o Mission should have clear authority. 
 Generally from the host country as national laws are important for the authorization, 
limitation and governance of civil-military cooperation – as well as providing the 
substantive laws which should generally rule. In the rare cases where authority is not 
given by host country, it must be given by UNSC or a body established by a treaty which 
the host country has signed. 
 This applies to the original authority for the mission itself. However, it should be clear 
that the Mission has clear continuing authority (cf the use of force in a potentially stale 
mandate – as in Iraq in the late 1990s is not desirable). 
o That authority and the actions officials take under the mission should be subject to ‘independent 
adjudication’ 
 Not just the International Criminal Court (ICC) but also ICJ. 
 Even if a country does not sign up to compulsory jurisdiction, it should sign up for its 
jurisdiction to allow independent adjudication of the legality of their actions. I know that 
this is unlikely now but good international citizens should have nothing to fear and their 
actions will be more effective. 
 While the need for this is acute if the host country does not authorize the mission, it 
should be standard fare and I hope to live to see the day when it is. 
o The mission’s dealings with the host country must be subject to international law. 
 The mandate (which provides the effective “constitutional” basis for the mission) should include the rule 
of law as a basic principle. 
 The rule of law should be a core part of the ethic of every group of officials within the mission – 
including military, police and civilian components from all countries contributing to the mission. 
 The conduct of police and military forces during the mission and compliance with relevant human rights 
norms. 
 The various institutional components of the mission should mutually support each other in respecting 
and furthering the rule of law within their mission – and recognize the relationship between the rule of 
law and protection of civilians. 
 Trials of those accused of perpetrating the violence against which the civilians had to be protected 
should be initiated by truly independent prosecutors before truly independent tribunals. Where these are 
not before permanent tribunals, the funding and selection should not be from either belligerents nor 
peace keepers.3  
 Peacekeepers should never come from belligerents. 
 
These issues apply to missions authorised under UNSC approval, regional (e.g. African Union (AU)) 
approval, mixed missions and in cases of bi-lateral agreements between a host state and one that provides 
assistance. 
 
Preconditions 
The list of preconditions in Chapter V of the Forum Draft is a very long and daunting list of minimum 
preconditions for success including: 
 UNSC authorisation identifying activities vital to rule of law. 
 A peace process ending the conflict. 
 All significant parties have signed the peace agreement and shown commitment to its application. 
 Donors have agreed to support strengthening the rule of law with adequate resources. 
 Unity of effort in mission leadership. 
 Host government and all other relevant stakeholders have the will and can develop the capacity to 
establish a strong system of the rule of law. 
While all these conditions are highly desirable and should be insisted on wherever possible. It is a good 
thing that nobody told those who helped bring about the rule of law in places like England that you needed 
all these preconditions. If Coke had read this chapter he would have known that even with an intervention 
force behind his back he should not have decided the three cases that provided the foundation of the rule of 
law in England (Prohibitions 1607, Dr Bonham’s case 1610 and Proclamations 1611). It was a near run 
thing – and he knew it. He knew he was risking his life and he the intervention of other senior ministers 
downplaying the effect of the decisions was needed to keep him out of the Tower of London on one 
occasion but insufficient on another. Nonetheless, he was released and managed to include these cases in the 
first of the Nominate Reports.4  
 
If you wait for all the preconditions to be there, you may never act. In fact, there was a favourable 
environment for the English judiciary to assert propositions that were prevalent in north western Europe and 
England during the previous half century but which the English judiciary would never have sought to assert 
against Tudor monarchs but were prepared to assert against a recently established Scottish king.   
 
Few peace keeping missions will have all these conditions.  By definition, some of those preconditions will 
never be met in peace-making or peace-enforcement operations. However, the rule of law is just as critical 
there. Indeed, Mike Kelly has argued very forcefully from Australian practice in Somalia, the rule of law 
                                                 
3 When Jamie Shea was asked in 1999 whether NATO pilots had committed war crimes he pointed to the 
funding of the International Criminal Tribunal for the form Yugoslavia (ICTY) and said that they would not 
be convicted. I do not know if the ICTY had contempt powers but whether or not they were, he should have 
been instantly suspended and subject to disciplinary proceedings. It is essential that officials appointed by a 
state should have the rule of law built into their ethics. Not only did Shea appear to have no ethics, he 
assumed the ICTY had none. 
4 An interesting legal version of the winners writing history. 
assists such efforts because the UN mission makes it very clear what actions it will not tolerate and against 
which it will use force. 
 
Resources 
We should always seek to provide our armed forces with adequate resources. Politicians who do not provide 
adequate resources when they can are rightly vilified as betrayers of those who are willing to risk their lives 
for the values their country stands for.  But the resources are not always available – especially in the time 
frame required to prevent mass atrocities. In real shooting wars it is rare for even the stronger side to have 
all the resources it would wish. The weaker side will have even less. In a rapidly developing genocide the 
number of troops that can be deployed within 24 or 48 hours is likely to be inadequate for many 
contingencies. Of course, it might be said that soldiers should not be asked to do that for the people of 
another state – but few would be so clear cut. The value of the lives of civilians does not fall into such a neat 
hierarchy – especially for those soldiers and police who are fully imbued with the UN spirit. 
 
However, this is where the international community can benefit from a public and credible determination to 
back up its soldiers. One of the reasons why the Serbian forces did not cross the bridge mentioned by Prince 
Hussein was the likely retaliation if they killed a UN soldier. The determination will mean that weak UN 
detachments are at less risk and can be more effective sooner.  
 
This is essentially the principle of policing. Protection of civilians is essentially a police function. Peace 
Missions generally need more evident military back up and their use for non-believers. 
 
For most of the Roman Empire, Roman citizens felt secure with the statement ‘Civis Romanus Sum’ 
because it was generally believed (and frequently demonstrated) that violence done to him would bring 
massive retaliation from Roman Legions. Of course, the security of other peoples was hardly enhanced by 
this policy. However, if the international community is willing to back its values with its resources and its 
actions, any person in the world will be able to say: ‘Civis Mundus Sum’ in a thousand living languages. “I 
am a citizen of the world” – and this will be more effective than masses of ‘blue helmets and blue bayonets’ 
on the ground. The backing is for the peoples of the world and for those who protect them.  
 
Research Questions: 
 The relationship between adherence to the international rule of law and effectiveness and legitimacy of 
missions – both as a matter of theory (those who enforce the law need to subject themselves to it) and 
practice in past missions.   
If, as expected, the rule of law at the national and international levels adds to mission effectiveness;  
 The extent to which the rule of law can be achieved in the kind of situations in which Protection 
Missions are formed and the best means of maximizing that extent at each stage of the mission. Given 
the variety of situations in which Protection Missions operate, is it possible to generalize about priorities 
in implementing the rule of law. 
 The means for ensuring that those within Protection Missions who are authorized to use force by the 
UNSC or regional bodies like the AU do not act beyond the authority given them. 
 Identifying how civilian and military components of UN missions can be instrumental for advancing or 
impeding domestic and international rule of law and vice versa 
 Identifying and addressing rule of law issues affecting Protection Missions 
 Identifying how Protection Missions can comply with, and advance the international rule of law 
including: 
o Measures by which states can ensure that their civilian and military forces act strictly within the 
scope of international law through doctrine, training, threats of sanctions and subjecting them to 
the same laws and institutions through which the perpetrators are tried. 
o The co-ordination between military, police and civilian officials of the countries providing 
assistance and the countries assisted. 
o Identification of clear rules (wherever possible firmly based on the laws and culture of the 
country or region being assisted by the mission) that apply to all and effective institutions for law 
enforcement. 
o The best ways of building the rule of law into missions themselves – making it a fundamental 
governance value, a basic ‘constitutional’ principle and an ethic for officials. 
 What contribution can be made by the various professions involved in Protection Missions (lawyers, 
soldiers, police, doctors, nurses). Lawyers and the military were critical in the development of the 
domestic rule of law. They have a critical role in the development of the international rule of law. Along 
with the police and other professions, they have a similarly critical role in building the rule of law into 
the heart of Protection Missions. 
 Identifying how Protection Missions can comply with and assist in the development of the domestic rule 
of law within the host country 
 To support force contributing states to take a more effective role in future Protection Missions by 
developing and disseminating understanding of how, and in what ways, adherence to the domestic and 
international rule of law can make PoC missions more effective.  
 
A larger integrative approach to RofL and PoC – Civilian Protection Systems 
The first duty of a state is generally supposed to be the protection of its civilians from internal and external 
threats to their security and is the principal justification cited for having and exercising sovereign powers.  
When a state is having difficulty in fulfilling that function it calls on other states and/or the UN. In very rare 
cases, the UNSC or a body that has relevant authority based on treaty (such as AU) may do so without such 
a request because the relevant state is unable or unwilling to seek assistance. 
 
However, this does not mean that PoC can or should be entirely the responsibility of such missions. When 
citizens are protected (in the sense of being relatively secure from major threats) in the majority of states, it 
is not purely because of the actions of the state. While the formal security forces and state institutions (such 
as courts and prisons) play an important role, important contributions frequently come from tribe and 
kinship groups, neighbours, social norms and physical factors such as having locks on doors. By the same 
token, the civil and military components of PoC missions play an important role but do so alongside the 
host government, state institutions, UN agencies, local civil society actors, NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent. Unfortunately, the perceived need for international assistance often overlooks the potential 
contribution of those being protected so that the mission is seen as solely responsible for civilian protection. 
This approach makes the mission far more difficult and extensive than it need be and also creates a huge 
transition problem.  
 
This new approach to understanding the ways that civilian protection is secured under a range of conditions 
(from ‘normal’ pre-conflict stages, through the mission and in the post-conflict stages) and the role that a 
UN mission can play in contributing to PoC during the mission and in the transition leading up to 
withdrawal.  
 
This approach applies integrity systems methodology to the more narrow issue of civilian protection.  
 
Our work on integrity systems suggests that: 
1) There are significant variations in integrity systems and there is no one model, western or otherwise. 
2) While integrity systems tend to perform similar functions, the institutions that perform them may vary 
3) Even where similar institutions occur in different integrity systems, they may perform different 
functions or a combination of functions. 
4) The strength and effectiveness of integrity systems is not merely a function of the strength of the 
component institutions but of their interactions with each other (what makes it a system). 
5) The primary function of an integrity system is to promote a positive value (integrity) rather than merely 
preventing its opposite (corruption). 
6) Each institutional element within an integrity system has to understand its own roles and the roles of 
others with which the institution interacts. 
7) Outcomes such as reduced corruption or increased transparency are rarely achieved by a single actor 
alone but are generally the result of the work of several actors who support each other when they are 
doing their job but will tend to check each other when they do not. 
8) Integrity institutions are rarely completely absent but vary from state to state. Accordingly, the best way 
to build an integrity system is not to try to implant a foreign model but build on what there is. That 
process may involve significant changes in existing institutions, some new institutions and building 
links between them. Foreign assistance is most useful in assisting host nations to identify gaps and 
weaknesses and addressing them rather than bringing in an entirely new system or attempting to ‘do it 
themselves’. 
A similar approach could be extremely fruitful in the protection of civilians. The mixture of institutions, 
agencies, norms and arrangements that afford a measure of security for civilians can be understood as 
‘civilian protection systems’ (CPS).  It would seem that most of the propositions about integrity systems 
would apply to civilian protection systems – though this hypothesis need to be tested  
 
1) Significant variations in civilian protection systems – no one model. 
2) CPS perform similar functions, the institutions that perform them may vary. 
3) Even if similar institutions occur in different CPSs, they may perform different functions. 
4) The strength and effectiveness of CPSs is not merely a function of the strength of the component 
institutions but of their interactions with each other (what makes it a system). 
5) The primary function of a CPS is to promote a positive value (security) rather than merely preventing its 
opposite (violence). 
6) Each institutional element within a CPS has to understand its own roles and the roles of others with 
which the institution interacts. 
7) Reduced violence is not achieved by a single actor alone but is generally the result of the work of 
several actors who support each other when doing their job but check each other when they do not. 
8) Civilian protection institutions are rarely completely absent but vary in effectiveness and reach. 
 
One comment on the applicability of point (8) above is that international assistance through peace-keeping 
missions should not be seen as creating new civilian protection systems but as fixing and enhancing existing 
civilian protection systems. This is both a more achievable goal and makes the transition and gradual 
withdrawal less problematic. This allows us to focus, limit and make possible effective protection missions 
and assist in strengthening the rule of law. It also allows us to deal with some major problems afflicting UN 
missions: the greater the role of the UN in dealing with the problem the less local ownership and the greater 
the difficulties of transition 
 
It also avoids the common mistake that is made in providing assistance for governance reform in developing 
countries – that existing institutions can be ignored and a new integrity system introduced on the basis of a 
models that work elsewhere. In civilian protection as well as good governance/corruption prevention, it is 
never the case that there is ‘nothing there’ on which to build. 
 
Civilian Protection Systems can be understood at four different stages. 
1. Pre conflict civilian protection systems – the institutional arrangements under which the majority of 
residents in the relevant region felt personally secure. This information will provide a backdrop to 
understanding the ways in which conflict disrupted the pre-conflict protection system leaving citizens 
without adequate protection 
2. Pre mission civilian protection systems – the arrangements by which civilians secured whatever measure 
of protection they had during the conflict (even if rudimentary and exploitative measures such as armed 
gangs in refugee camps which may provide a measure of protection). This reflects the fact that there will 
always be a gap between the emergence of the conflict and the arrival of the international mission. 
3. Civilian protection systems during the mission – including the assistance provided by civil and military 
elements. 
4. Post mission civilian protection systems – institutional arrangements under which civilians can regain a 
level of security equal to, or often better than, the pre-conflict level. 
 
Subsystems: It may be useful to see civilian protection systems divided into ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
protection systems with the former sometimes breaking down completely or ‘turning feral’ and becoming a 
threat to the very civilians they were supposed to protect. Another form of subsystem might be found when 
a mission specifically focuses on particular risks to civilians then the work on civilian protection systems for 
that mission would concentrate on how the civilian protection systems at the four different stages operate 
for the identified risk. 
